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Abstract
The international exchange of goods and services is increasingly organised along global
value chains in which the various production stages are carried out at many different
locations all over the world. A country can be seen as holding a central position in global
trade to the extent that it is involved in a large number of economic transactions with
alternative potential suppliers and has a wide access to different important markets.
However, the centrality of countries’ positions in the international production of goods
and services may vary according to the specific stages of the production process that
countries occupy. Here we adopt a network-based perspective, and propose a novel
three-faceted measure of centrality that captures countries’ distinct roles at the upstream,
midstream, and downstream stages of the international production process. Findings
suggest that rankings of countries based on our measures of centrality vary across
production stages. While emerging and developing countries tend to secure central
positions at upstream and midstream production stages, high-income countries tend
to exert prevailing roles at downstream stages. Moreover, rankings based on our
measures differ from alternative rankings obtained from traditional measures of market
power simply reflecting aggregate trade values. This is especially the case within more
traditional industries, such as Textiles and Apparel, in which small and less developed
countries can play relevant roles at various stages of the production process.
Keywords: Global value networks, Centrality, Market power, Upstreamness,
Midstreamness, Downstreamness
Introduction
The increasing relevance of global value chains (GVCs) in international trade has been
widely emphasised by a number of recent studies (e.g., Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales 2015;
Johnson and Noguera 2012; Timmer et al. 2014). GVCs are the result of production
processes stretching across multiple countries (i.e., the international fragmentation of
production), so that different phases of the production of a final good are undertaken in
different countries to exploit the specific comparative advantage of each location. Such
international organisation of production is responsible for the occurrence of multiple
trade exchanges among countries, which have recently been estimated to represent about
half of all trade flows (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales 2015).
In this work, we draw on data concerned with world trade in three different sectors
to uncover the network structure and dynamics of GVCs. It is reasonable to expect
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that the organisation of trade flows driven by international production linkages differs
from the one of aggregate traditional trade flows, especially in sectors, like the ones
examined here, where the internationalisation of production processes is widespread.
Trade flows related to intermediate inputs connecting production phases do not nec-
essarily mirror the trade flows originating from the main producers of a given product
and directed toward the largest markets of consumers. Rather, GVCs might involve
intermediaries and assembly spots located in countries far away from the technologi-
cal frontier or in countries holding only a small share of the international market of the
final product.
This has prompted our interest in assessing the centrality of countries in the global
network of links generated by international production processes. Indeed, according to
extant economicmodels, the position of a country within an international production sys-
tem is correlated with the share of value it adds to production and with the share of bene-
fits it obtains from trade (Costinot et al. 2013; Johnson and Noguera 2012). To shed light
on a country’s participation in global trade, it is therefore important to understand where
the country is positioned in a GVC, and how relevant its role is at the various stages of
production. There is a growing literature concerned with measures for assessing a coun-
try’s participation and position in GVCs (e.g., Antràs and Chor 2013; Antràs et al. 2012;
Daudin et al. 2011; Koopman et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2013), and our work aims to con-
tribute precisely to this stream of literature by adopting a network analysis approach to
international production and trade.
An advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it does not assume interna-
tional trade to occur merely from producers to final consumers. Rather, it allows us
to describe international trade more appropriately as an international production net-
work arising from a sequence of production steps involving potentially multiple countries
before the final product can reach the final destination markets of consumers. Indeed
countries in such production network may receive inputs from multiple sources and
may contribute to the production process at multiple stages located in more than one
country. To fully assess the role that countries play in international trade, it is there-
fore crucial to distinguish between flows of intermediate products and flows of final
ones, and then uncover the position countries occupy at each production step of the
underlying GVC.
We begin by assessing the salience and distinctive properties of the network measure
of centrality within the broad context of the international global value networks (GVNs).
We then describe the bilateral trade data set on which our study draws, and outline the
procedure used to distinguish between intermediate and final products and to extract the
international GVNs from the underlying international aggregate trade networks. Based
on a tripartite valued and directed graph, we propose a formalisation of a three-faceted
measure of centrality that captures the distinct roles each country plays as an exporter or
importer at the upstream, midstream, and downstream stages of the production process.
We evaluate our centrality measures in three industries (Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and
Textiles and Apparel), and assess their evolution between 2007 and 2014. We then com-
pare rankings of countries based on our centrality measures with alternative rankings
based on traditional economic measures based on gross value of exports and imports.
We conclude by summarising and discussing our results, outlining their limitations, and
suggesting avenues for future work.
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Centrality and the global value network
Centrality has long been a fundamental concept in the study of various types of net-
works. Most measures of centrality so far advocated aim to capture a node’s struc-
tural importance by computing its involvement in the walk structure of a network
(Borgatti and Everett 2006; Freeman 1978). Among various empirical applications, cen-
trality has been used to investigate power (Brass 1984; Burt 1982), social influence
in inter-organisational networks (Laumann and Pappi 1973; Galaskiewicz 1979), adop-
tion and diffusion of innovation (Coleman et al. 1966), and employment opportunities
(Granovetter 1974).
While centrality measures have mostly been developed for one-mode, binary, and time-
invariant networks, there have been a number of attempts to extend such measures to
two-mode networks (Faust 1997), or more generally K-partite graphs, as well as weighted
(Barrat et al. 2004), multiplex (Boccaletti et al. 2014; Menichetti et al. 2014; Rahmede et al.
2017) and time-varying networks (Nicosia et al. 2013). Attempts have also been made to
cross-classify centrality measures in terms of various criteria, including their underlying
assumptions on how processes unfold in a network (e.g., the trajectories followed and the
method of spread) (Borgatti 2005), and the type of nodal involvement and property of
walk assessed (Borgatti and Everett 2006).
Recently, a number of studies have drawn upon the network literature to develop suit-
able sets of metrics to capture the role that countries play in the international GVCs.
For instance, it has been suggested that measures for identifying hubs and spokes at
the sectoral level can help uncover the connection between global trade patterns and
global supply chains (Lejour et al. 2014). Yet, what is still largely missing is an analytical
framework in which the centrality of a country is explicitly formalised as a multi-faceted
measure that captures the country’s position at the various production stages into which
the international GVNs are organised.
The international GVN in a given industry can be regarded as a special case of K-
partite weighted and time-varying networks in which goods and services flow from one
country to another following complex trajectories along the production process, typi-
cally ending in final consumption. These trajectories can be seen as organised into K
distinct stages that can be traversed by goods and services along one distinct direction
– i.e., from upstream toward downstream – yet through transactions in which the same
country can occupy multiple roles. For example, country ni may export an intermedi-
ate product to country nj to be transformed, and then import from the same country nj
the output of such transformation that, in turn, will be further transformed. Thus, the
flow process of production may involve the same country multiple times. Moreover, links
between countries are weighted as, by construction, they are associated with the volume
or value of the goods and services exchanged. Finally, as the production process unfolds
over time, each transaction is time-stamped and the underlying network is therefore
time-varying.
Formally, a GVN is an input-output K-partite graph with K sets of nodes such that
nodes in each set ki are only linked to nodes in set ki+1 for i < K . Thus, nodes in set k1
only send links to nodes in set k2, nodes in set kK only receive links from nodes in set
kK−1, and the remaining nodes in set ki, for 1 < i < K , receive links from nodes in ki−1
and send links to nodes in ki+1. Such input-output K-partite graph can be represented in
the following matrix form
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A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 A1,2 0 . . . 0
0 0 A2,3 . . . 0
... . . . . . . 0
0 . . . AK−1,K
0 . . . 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (1)
where Ai,j is the sub-matrix of the adjacency matrix A representing the links from nodes
in set ki to nodes in set kj, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K . Thus, adjacency matrix A is a block matrix,
with blocks Ai,j. As an illustrative example, Fig. 1 shows an input-output tripartite graph
in which the three sets correspond to distinct production stages and contain four, three,
and four countries, respectively.
The adjacency matrixW corresponding to Fig. 1 is
W =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
8 0 0
6 4 0
0 0 9
0 0 6
0
0 0
4 0 0 0
10 6 0 0
0 0 7 11
0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (2)
Unlike affiliation networks, in which each link relates an actor to a subset of events
and each event to a subset of actors, the international GVN is dyadic since links relate
countries with one another, albeit in different roles (Faust 1997). Correspondingly, the
duality property of affiliation networks does not apply to the GVN as countries are not
linked to one another through shared memberships of collectives, and collectives are not
linked through shared countries. Rather, countries sharing connections to or from the
Fig. 1 Example of an input-output tripartite weighted graph. The sets k1, k2, and k3 represent three
production stages. Only links from nodes in set k1 to nodes in set k2 and links from nodes in set k2 to nodes in
set k3 are allowed. Above each link is indicated the value of its corresponding weight. The width of each link
is proportional to the corresponding weight
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same country may be seen as competing for the same customer or for the same supplier,
respectively.
As in affiliation networks, however, in the GVN there should be centrality scores for
each country belonging to each of the K sets. Furthermore, there should be some ana-
lytical relationships between these scores. That is, it is reasonable to assume that the
centrality of a country ni in set ki is proportional to: (i) the centralities of the countries
that are members of the set ki−1 from which ni receives a connection, and (ii) the cen-
tralities of the countries in set ki+1 to which ni directs a connection. Thus, as in the case
of affiliation networks, focusing only on single sets of nodes (e.g., on a single stage of the
production) would imply neglecting the fundamental relationships among sets of nodes
across the whole network. Rather, the centrality of a country at a given production stage
within a given industry should quantify the salience of that country for the entire GVN, and
thus explicitly depend on the centrality of the other countries located at other production
stages and with which the focal country is connected.
The data
Our study draws upon the bilateral trade data set extracted from the BACI-CEPII
database. The data set refers to the years 2007 and 2014, and includes 221 countries.
Trade flows are recorded as 6-digit codes according to the Harmonized System (HS) clas-
sification (Revision 2002). We restricted our analysis to the trade flows in three industrial
sectors: Electronics (HS02 Codes 85XXXX), Motor Vehicles (HS02 Codes 87XXXX), and
Textiles and Apparel (HS02 Codes from 50XXXX to 63XXXX).
We then applied the Broad Economic Categories classification to assign each 6-digit
code to one of the following three broad economic categories: “intermediate goods”, “con-
sumer goods”, and “capital goods” (see Tables 1 and 2). We then aggregated consumer
goods and capital goods into a broader “finished products” category. Finally, we used the
two categories of intermediate goods and finished products to extract from the inter-
national trade network the international GVNs in which countries play distinct roles as
exporters or importers at various stages of the production process (see details in the
following section).
Table 1 USD values (current prices) and share of intermediate, consumer, and capital goods in the
Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and Textiles and Apparel industries in 2007
2007
Industry World trade value Share
Electronics 1,781,260,000
Intermediate goods 1,050,100,000 59%
Consumer goods 235,910,000 13%
Capital goods 495,250,000 28%
Motor vehicles 1,184,322,000
Intermediate goods 311,900,000 26%
Consumer goods 660,812,000 56%
Capital goods 211,610,000 18%
Textiles and Apparel 601,090,000
Intermediate goods 217,920,000 36%
Consumer goods 383,170,000 64%
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Table 2 USD values (current prices), share, and rate of variation of intermediate, consumer, and
capital goods in the Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and Textiles and Apparel industries in 2014
2014
Industry World trade value Change in value (%) Share Change in share (%)
Electronics 2,241,940,000 26%
Intermediate goods 1,285,900,000 22% 57% -3%
Consumer goods 232,250,000 -1% 10% -22%
Capital goods 723,790,000 46% 32% 16%
Motor vehicles 1,364,500,000 15%
Intermediate goods 402,230,000 29% 29% 12%
Consumer goods 733,480,000 11% 54% -4%
Capital goods 228,760,000 8% 17% -6%
Textiles and Apparel 753,750,000 25%
Intermediate goods 262,210,000 20% 35% -4%
Consumer goods 491,540,000 28% 65% -2%
As indicated by Tables 1 and 2, between 2007 and 2014 the traded value of Motor Vehi-
cles increased by 15%, which is less than the increase in the traded value in Electronics
(25%) and in Textiles and Apparel (26%). Over the same period, the value of merchandise
trade (including commodities) at world level increased by approximately 35%. Our period
of observation includes the years in which trade was deeply affected by the international
financial crisis, displaying large economic fluctuations, especially in sectors with a strong
presence of GVCs, such as the ones considered here. In spite of this, no substantial change
in trade composition can be observed between the two years analysed. Nevertheless, it
is worth noting that in the Textiles and Apparel industry the finished products represent
two thirds of the total trade in the same industry, with only a small difference between
2007 and 2014. The same can be observed in the Motor Vehicles sector. In particular, in
Motor Vehicles, finished products toward final consumption represent more than 50% of
the total trade in that industry in both years, with only a negligible decline in 2014. At the
same time, trade of intermediate inputs increased between 2007 and 2014 while trade of
finished products decreased, and trade of consumer goods remained lower than trade of
capital goods in both years. By contrast, in Electronics trade remained concentrated more
on intermediate inputs than finished products, and trade of capital goods was higher than
trade of consumer goods in both 2007 and 2014, though between the two years the former
increased while the latter decreased.
Constructing the international global value networks
A necessary step toward the assessment of the centrality of countries in GVCs is repre-
sented by the extraction of the GVNs – i.e., the networks in which connections between
countries are qualified as a function of the type of product traded – from the underlying
international trade networks – i.e., the networks in which countries are connected to one
another irrespective of the stage of production they occupy.
To this end, we define the tripartite valued graph whose nodes are partitioned into three
different independent sets,U,M, andD, such that no two endpoints of a link belong to the
same set, nor one to setU and the other to setD. The first setU refers to the population of
exporters of intermediate inputs. The second set M refers to the population of countries
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that are importers of intermediate products or exporters of finished products or both
importers of intermediate products and exporters of finished products. Finally, the third
set D includes the importers of finished products.
So conceived of, only directed links connecting nodes in set U to nodes in set M and
directed links connecting nodes in set M to nodes in set D are allowed. In particular, a
directed link is established from a node in set U to a node in set M if the former node
supplies intermediate inputs to the latter. Similarly, a directed link is established from a
node in setM set to a node in set D if the former node supplies a finished product to the
latter. Moreover, the weight of each link is given by the value in US dollars of the goods
traded by the two connected countries.
In each set, each country can play an “active” or a “non-active” role. A country is active
in a given set when it is involved in at least a trade flow of the nature defined by the set. For
example, if a node is connected to the other nodes by only import trade flows of finished
products, then it will be classified as “active” in set D and ”non-active” in the remaining
two sets. The total number of countries N thus corresponds to the maximum number of
“active” nodes each set can include. Moreover, in a given industry and a given year, each
node in set U can have at most N − 1 outgoing links pointing to nodes in set M. Each
node in setM can have at most N − 1 incoming links emanating from nodes in set U and
N − 1 outgoing links pointing to nodes in set D. Finally, each node in set D can receive at
most N − 1 incoming links from nodes in setM. That is, while a given country ni can be
member of all three sets, and therefore exert different roles at the same time in the GVN,
it cannot point a link to itself in a different set.
Formally, we indicate with wIum the outgoing weighted link representing the trade of
intermediate inputs from node u belonging to setU to nodem belonging to setM. More-
over, we indicate with wFmd the outgoing weighted link representing the trade of finished
products from nodem belonging to setM toward node d belonging to set D.
The tripartite network can be formalised in terms of the weightedmatrixW3−p in which
the entries are defined as follows
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
wIum > 0 if country u exports intermediate products to countrym;
wFmd > 0 if countrym exports finished products to country d;
wIum = wFmd = 0 otherwise.
(3)
Notice that in the international GVNs each country can play multiple roles simultane-
ously. For instance, within the same industry a country may import both intermediate and
finished products, and at the same time also export both intermediate and finished prod-
ucts. So conceived of, the international GVNs thus capture the nuances of the GVCs, such
as the exchange of the same intermediate or final products among different countries. In
the case of intermediate products, when multiple transactions of intermediate products
take place before the final products are exported, each country involved in such transac-
tions would play the dual roles as exporter and importer of intermediate products, and
thus would belong to both set U and setM. Similarly, in the case of multiple transactions
of the same final products among countries, each country involved would play the roles as
exporter and importer of such products, and would thus belong to both setM and set D.
The international GVN in a given industry can also be formalised as a two-layer multi-
plex network, in which the nodes are the countries, and each layer corresponds to one of
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two types of product traded between countries: intermediate and finished (De Domenico
et al. 2015; Rahmede et al. 2017). Countries that belong to all three sets would also be part
of both the intermediate-product layer and the finished-product layer. Countries that only
belong to setU or only to setDwould be nodes, respectively, in the intermediate-product
layer or the finished-product layer. Countries belonging to set M that both import
intermediate products and export finished ones would be nodes in both layers. Finally,
countries in set M that only export finished products or only import intermediate prod-
ucts would be nodes only in the finished-product layer or in the intermediate-product
layer, respectively.
Formalising the centrality of countries in the international global value
networks
The roles that countries occupy within the international GVNs can be unmasked through
the application of suitable centrality measures to the international trade network of inter-
mediate and finished products. To this end, here we propose the following three measures
of centrality for capturing the degree to which a given country plays a prevailing role in
the upstream, midstream, and downstream stages of the production in a given industry’s
GVN:
(a) A country’s upstreamness centrality in an industry captures the tendency of the
country to preferentially export intermediate goods to other countries that, in turn,
have a tendency to preferentially export finished products and import intermediate
inputs.
(b) A country’s downstreamness centrality in an industry captures the tendency of the
country to preferentially import final products from countries that, in turn, tend to
preferentially export finished products and import intermediate inputs.
(c) A country’s midstreamness centrality in an industry is a function of both the
upstreamness of the countries from which the focal country imports the
intermediate products and the downstreamness of the countries to which the focal
country exports the finished products. More specifically, a country’s
midstreamness centrality in an industry captures the tendency of the country to
import intermediate goods preferentially from countries with high upstreamness
centrality and to export final products preferentially to countries with high
downstreamness centrality.
Given an industry, these three measures will be applied to the directed and weighted
international global value tripartite network defined above, in which nodes are suitably
labelled according to the roles they play as exporters or importers of intermediate or
finished products.
We now proceed to formalise the three recursive measures of centrality. We begin by
formalising the first-order midstreamness centrality, and we then formalise the first-order
upstreamness and first-order downstreamness centralities as a function of first-order
midstreamness centrality. In a similar way, we show how a h-order midstreamness
centrality can be defined in terms of the h−1-order upstreamness and h−1-order down-
streamness centralities. The three centralities then converge to higher-order values that
are the solutions of a linear system of equations.
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First, we define the first-order midstreamness centrality of a country as the sum of the
intermediate inputs imported and the finished products exported by the country. This
measure thus broadly captures the country’s centrality as an intermediary actor in the
production of products in a certain industry. Formally, a countrym in setM can be char-
acterised by the sum of the weights of all its incoming and outgoing links, i.e., the total
strength sm, as follows
μ1m = sm =
∑
u∈U
wIum +
∑
d∈D
wFmd. (4)
To normalise the first-order midstreamness centrality of each country, we divide Eq. 4 by
the maximum midstreamness value across all countries
μ1m
μ∗
× 100, (5)
where μ∗ = max
m
(μ1m).
Next, the first-order upstreamness centrality of a country u included in set U is defined
as the weighed sum of the values of its outgoing links representing the exports of interme-
diate inputs toward countries in set M, where the weight of the value of each link in the
sum is the first-order midstreamness centrality μ1m of the countrym in setM to which the
link is directed. Formally, we define the first-order upstreamness centrality of a country u
in set U as follows
υ1u =
∑
m∈M
μ1mwIum. (6)
To normalise the first-order upstreamness centrality of each country, we then divide
Eq. 6 by the maximum upstreamness value across all countries
υ1u
υ∗
× 100, (7)
where υ∗ = max
u
(υ1u).
The first-order downstreamness centrality of a country d included in set D is instead
defined as the weighed sum of the values of the country’s incoming links representing the
imports of finished products from countries in set M, where the weight of the value of
each link in the sum is the first-order midstreamness centrality μ1m of the country m in
setM from which the link originates. Formally, we define the first-order downstreamness
centrality of a country d in set D as follows
δ1d =
∑
m∈M
μ1mwFmd. (8)
To normalise the first-order downstreamness centrality of each country, we then divide
Eq. 8 by the maximum downstreamness value across all countries
δ1d
δ∗
× 100, (9)
where δ∗ = max
d
(δ1d).
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Next, we define the second-order midstreamness centrality of a country m in set M as
the weighted sum of the values of the links that m receives from countries in set U and
directs to countries in set D, where the weights in the sum of the values of the links from
countries in set U and to countries in set D are, respectively, the first-order upstream-
ness centralities of the countries in U and the first-order downstreamness centralities of
the countries in D. Formally, we define the second-order midstreamness centrality of a
countrym in setM as
μ2m =
∑
u∈U
υ1uwIum +
∑
d∈D
δ1dwFmd. (10)
To normalise the second-order midstreamness centrality of each country, we then
divide Eq. 10 by the maximum value of midstreamness across all countries
μ2m
μ∗
× 100, (11)
where μ∗ = max
m
(μ2m).
Finally, the higher-order upstreamness, downstreamness, and midstreamness centrality
measures are the solutions of the following linear system
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
υhu =
∑
m∈M μhmwIum
δhd =
∑
m∈M μhmwFmd
μhm =
∑
u∈U υh−1u wIum +
∑
d∈D δ
h−1
d wFmd
(12)
All countries that are involved in at least one transaction (exports or imports) of (inter-
mediate or finished) products will be assigned at least one value of the centralities defined
above. In the previous section we mentioned that the international GVNs capture the
nuances of international trade, such as chains of multiple transactions of intermediate
or finished products. In particular, two cases can be identified. First, a country may well
control the whole production of a given product, and contribute to the exports with-
out importing any input. Second, a country may play a prominent role in many stages of
the transformation process without necessarily exporting the final product. In the former
case, the country that exports finished products but does not import intermediate ones
would still occupy the midstream stage of the GVN and thus be classified as part of setM.
However, since there would be no incoming links pointing to the country, its midstream-
ness centrality would not be defined in terms of the upstreamness of other countries.
Similarly, in the latter case, the country that exports and imports only intermediate prod-
ucts would occupy both an upstream and a midstream stage in the GVN, and would thus
be classified as a member of both set U and set M. However, since there are no outgoing
flows of finished products from that country toward other countries, its midstreamness
centrality would not be defined in terms of the downsteamness centralities of the other
countries.
Results
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the variation in the rankings and values (normalised according to
Eqs. 5, 7, and 9) of upstream (left-hand column), midstream (centre column), and down-
stream (right-hand column) centralities of countries, respectively in Electronics, Motor
Vehicles, and Textile and Apparel, between 2007 and 2014. For the sake of simplicity, the
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Fig. 2 Bump charts showing the variation in rankings and values of upstreamness (left-hand column),
midstreamness (centre column), and downstreamness (right-hand column) centralities of countries in the
Electronics industry between 2007 and 2014. Each line in the bump charts shows the variation of ranking for
each country, and the width of each line at the two endpoints is proportional to the centrality score in the
corresponding year. Only the 20 top-ranked countries in 2014 have been included. The scores underlying the
two rankings in each bump chart have been normalised so as to produce equal sums of widths of endpoints
at each year. Beside each bump chart is a table illustrating the rankings and centrality scores normalised
according to Eqs. 5, 7, and 9. The colour of each line in the bump charts refers to the geographic continent of
the corresponding country. Bump charts were obtained using RAWGraphs
figures restrict their focus only to the 20 top-ranked countries in 2014, and show which
positions these countries held in 2007.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the rankings and values of upstreamness centrality, midstream-
ness centrality, downstreamness centrality, exports, and imports of countries in 2014,
respectively in the Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and Textiles and Apparel industries. In
panel (a) in all these figures, the size of each node (country) in the tripartite network is
proportional to: (i) the sum of the country’s exports of intermediate inputs (upstream);
(ii) the sum of the country’s imports of intermediate inputs and exports of final products
Fig. 3 Bump charts showing the variation in rankings and values of upstreamness (left-hand column),
midstreamness (centre column), and downstreamness (right-hand column) centralities of countries in the
Motor Vehicles industry between 2007 and 2014. Each line in the bump charts shows the variation of ranking
for each country, and the width of each line at the two endpoints is proportional to the centrality score in the
corresponding year. Only the 20 top-ranked countries in 2014 have been included. The scores underlying the
two rankings in each bump chart have been normalised so as to produce equal sums of widths of endpoints
at each year. Beside each bump chart is a table illustrating the rankings and centrality scores normalised
according to Eqs. 5, 7, and 9. The colour of each line in the bump charts refers to the geographic continent of
the corresponding country. Bump charts were obtained using RAWGraphs
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Fig. 4 Bump charts showing the variation in rankings and values of upstreamness (left-hand column),
midstreamness (centre column), and downstreamness (right-hand column) centralities of countries in the
Textiles and Apparel industry between 2007 and 2014. Each line in the bump charts shows the variation of
ranking for each country, and the width of each line at the two endpoints is proportional to the centrality
score in the corresponding year. Only the 20 top-ranked countries in 2014 have been included. The scores
underlying the two rankings in each bump chart have been normalised so as to produce equal sums of
widths of endpoints at each year. Beside each bump chart is a table illustrating the rankings and centrality
scores normalised according to Eqs. 5, 7, and 9. The colour of each line in the bump charts refers to the
geographic continent of the corresponding country. Bump charts were obtained using RAWGraphs
(midstream); and (iii) the sum of the country’s imports of final products (downstream). At
each production step of the GVN in a given industry, countries are then ranked according
to the corresponding centrality score (highest at the top). Panels (b) and (c) of the same
figures show the geographic map in which each country is represented as a circle whose
diameter is proportional to the country’s total exports (panel (b)) and total imports (panel
(c)), and whose colour varies according to the corresponding value of upstreamness (panel
(b)) and downstreamness (panel (c)) centralities.
Additional file 1: Tables S1, S2, and S3 report the top 50 countries ranked according to
the exports in 2014 in the Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and Textiles and Apparel indus-
tries, respectively. In all these tables, alternative rankings based on, and the corresponding
values of, imports in 2014, and upstreamness centrality, midstreamness centrality, and
downstreamness centrality in 2007 and 2014 are also reported.
The positions that countries occupy in the international GVNs are not only determined
by the sheer size of the countries in terms of potential output (given by the amount of
labour force, physical capital and technology available) or domestic demand (given by
population and income). Certainly, the economic size of countries is relevant for it allows
them to expand their production and trade, but it is not the only factor affecting the
countries’ centrality in the international production networks. This can be observed in
Figs. 5, 6, and 7, where the size of countries measured in terms of exports and imports is
compared to their centrality scores. Exports, if normalised, are equivalent to a country’s
share of the world’s total exports in a given sector, and it is highly correlated with the eco-
nomic size in terms of gross domestic product of countries (De Benedictis et al. 2014).
Also the correlation between exports (imports) and our centrality measures is positive,
but far from perfect. For example, in the case of Electronics, Fig. 5 suggests that China is
the second-ranked country in terms of imports, but it is not equally central as a final mar-
ket for these goods since it holds a much lower-ranked position in downstream centrality.
Somewhat similar profiles are the ones of Taiwan and Malaysia, countries that import
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Fig. 5 Rankings and values of upstreamness centrality, midstreamness centrality, downstreamness centrality,
exports, and imports of countries in the Electronics industry in 2014. In panel (a), the size of each node
(country) in the network is proportional to the sum of the country’s exports of intermediate inputs
(upstream), the sum of the country’s imports of intermediate inputs and exports of final products
(midstream), and the sum of the country’s imports of final products (downstream). For each centrality
measure, countries are ranked according to the corresponding score (highest at the top). Each directed link
connects a country in set U to a country in setM, or a country in setM to a country in set U, according to the
definition of the tripartite network given in the text. The width of each link is proportional to the value of
products exchanged by the two connected countries. The colour of each link refers to the continent of the
country from which the link originates. Panels (b) and (c) show the geographic map in which each country is
represented as a circle whose diameter is proportional to the country’s total exports (panel (b)) and total
imports (panel (c)), and whose colour varies according to the corresponding value of upstreamness (panel
(b)) and downstreamness (panel (c)) centralities. The network in panel (a) was visualised through VOS Viewer.
Maps in panels (b) and (c) were visualised using Tableau Software
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Fig. 6 Rankings and values of upstreamness centrality, midstreamness centrality, downstreamness centrality,
exports, and imports of countries in the Motor Vehicles industry in 2014. In panel (a), the size of each node
(country) in the network is proportional to the sum of the country’s exports of intermediate inputs
(upstream), the sum of the country’s imports of intermediate inputs and exports of final products
(midstream), and the sum of the country’s imports of final products (downstream). For each centrality
measure, countries are ranked according to the corresponding score (highest at the top). Each directed link
connects a country in set U to a country in setM, or a country in setM to a country in set U, according to the
definition of the tripartite network given in the text. The width of each link is proportional to the value of
products exchanged by the two connected countries. The colour of each link refers to the continent of the
country from which the link originates. Panels (b) and (c) show the geographic map in which each country is
represented as a circle whose diameter is proportional to the country’s total exports (panel (b)) and total
imports (panel (c)), and whose colour varies according to the corresponding value of upstreamness (panel
(b)) and downstreamness (panel (c)) centralities. The network in panel (a) was visualised through VOS Viewer.
Maps in panels (b) and (c) were visualised using Tableau Software
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Fig. 7 Rankings and values of upstreamness centrality, midstreamness centrality, downstreamness centrality,
exports, and imports of countries in the Textiles and Apparel industry in 2014. In panel (a), the size of each
node (country) in the network is proportional to the sum of the country’s exports of intermediate inputs
(upstream), the sum of the country’s imports of intermediate inputs and exports of final products
(midstream), and the sum of the country’s imports of final products (downstream). For each centrality
measure, countries are ranked according to the corresponding score (highest at the top). Each directed link
connects a country in set U to a country in setM, or a country in setM to a country in set U, according to the
definition of the tripartite network given in the text. The width of each link is proportional to the value of
products exchanged by the two connected countries. The colour of each link refers to the continent of the
country from which the link originates. Panels (b) and (c) show the geographic map in which each country is
represented as a circle whose diameter is proportional to the country’s total exports (panel (b)) and total
imports (panel (c)), and whose colour varies according to the corresponding value of upstreamness (panel
(b)) and downstreamness (panel (c)) centralities. The network in panel (a) was visualised through VOS Viewer.
Maps in panels (b) and (c) were visualised using Tableau Software
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many electronic intermediate products but are not equally relevant as a final market (see
also Fig. 2). On the contrary, countries such as Mexico and Brazil are more central in the
intermediate positions of the international production network of electronic goods than
their trade volumes would lead us to expect, while many advanced European countries
are much less central. As indicated by Fig. 6, in the Motor Vehicles industry some small
countries such as the Czech Republic and Austria, tightly connected to the German pro-
duction chain, maintain very central positions especially at the upstream and midstream
stages where, respectively, they produce and export components, and import components
and export final goods (see also Fig. 3). The industry where the correlation between the
more traditional measures of trade and our measures of centrality is generally lower is the
Textile and Apparel, a traditional industry where also small and less developed countries
can play relevant roles at various stages of the production (Fig. 7).
The observed deviations between a standard measure of relevance in trade, such as
exports or imports, and our indicators imply that our centrality measures capture the
economic relevance of a country in a given sector beyond its market share in that sec-
tor. In particular, the overall results that we obtained provide empirical support in favour
of many of the hypotheses offered by recently proposed economic models on GVCs:
different countries hold the most central positions at different stages of the production
process. Emerging and developing countries tend to be more central in the midstream
production phases. In the Textiles and Apparel sector, Bangladesh is the third most cen-
tral country, as it is a very relevant location for the production and assembly of many
apparel intermediate goods (see Fig. 4). However, Bangladesh does not seem to control
the organisation of production of these goods, as its relative centrality in the upstream
position is much lower. In the same sector, the highest downstream centrality is held by
more advanced countries (e.g., USA, Japan, Germany), whose large domestic markets and
important distribution chains allow them to maintain these positions. As indicated by
Figs. 2, 3, and 4, this pattern characterises all sectors: high-income countries with large
markets tend to secure a higher value of downstreamness centrality than low-income
countries.
The GVN in Electronics, especially in the upstream and midstream positions, is dom-
inated by East Asian countries that appear indeed as the world’s “factory” in this sector
(see Fig. 3). But in another technologically advanced sector such as Motor Vehicles, mid-
stream central positions too are held by relatively advanced countries (see Fig. 4). The
Motor Vehicles industry is still organised around some European and North American
countries, but it is highly internationalised as a number of small countries play a relevant
role at various stages of the corresponding GVN.
We also note that the structure of the international production networks is organised
differently across sectors, in qualitative agreement with what has been suggested by other
studies of sectoral trade networks (Cingolani et al. 2015). The production in the Textiles
and Apparel sector is relatively less centralised, with groups of countries holding simi-
lar positions (see Fig. 4 and panels (b) and (c) in Fig. 7). In the Electronics and Motor
Vehicles industries, the number of countries with very high centrality is smaller and more
geographically concentrated within specific areas (see Fig. 2 and panels (b) and (c) in
Figs. 5 and 6, respectively). This is what would be expected in sectors where technological
knowledge is important for production and this knowledge is concentrated only within a
minority of countries.
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Our findings also suggest that over time many emerging countries strengthened their
participation in GVNs. China is by far the most central country in the intermediate parts
of the Textiles and Electronics industries, and its position has increased at the upstream
production stage in the Motor Vehicles and Textiles industries (see Figs. 2, 3, and 4). But
besides the particular case of China, our results indicate that the upstreamness centrality
of other smaller countries in East Asia, such as Vietnam, and in parts of Central Europe
and South America, has also increased over time.
Conclusions
The international production of goods and services is increasingly organised along GVCs
in which the various production tasks are performed at many different locations all
over the world. Typically, production is not co-extensive with final consumption. Indeed
intermediate goods produced in one country can be further transformed by many other
countries, and follow complex chains of production stages (at which the same coun-
try may, in principle, be involved multiple times) before they are exported and finally
consumed in the destination markets. Thus, the market power that a country exerts in
global trade cannot be properly assessed simply by relying on traditional trade statistics
constructed from gross trade values (Lejour et al. 2014).
Centrality in global trade is important insofar as it enables a country to have a large
number of economic transactions with alternative potential suppliers and wide access to
different importantmarkets. However, within GVNs the role of centrality changes accord-
ing to which phase of the production process each country occupies. Recent economic
literature on trade in value added has described upstream and downstream positions
as more advantageous sources of bargaining power that strengthen countries’ ability to
set prices than other intermediate positions in the production process (Johnson and
Noguera 2012). High centrality in upstream phases enables a country to control key inputs
to the production process, while high centrality in the downstream phases enables a coun-
try to remain close to the final demand and thus to control final prices in the destination
markets (Antràs et al. 2012). To fully assess a country’s position in the international pro-
duction of goods and services, it is therefore crucial to evaluate a country’s centrality at
the various stages into which the GVCs can be articulated (Li et al. 2014).
Our study was an attempt to pave the way in this direction. To this end, we proposed
a novel three-faceted measure of centrality that captures a country’s distinct roles at the
upstream, midstream, and downstream stages of the international production process.
Underlying the formalisation of our centrality measure was the construction of the inter-
national GVNs – in which connections between countries are qualified in terms of the
type of product traded – from the aggregate trade network – in which no distinction
is made between different stages of production. The GVNs were then formalised as tri-
partite weighted and directed graphs in which nodes (i.e., countries) are partitioned into
three different independent sets, each representing a production stage.
We computed our three recursive measures of upstreamness, midstreamness, and
downstreamness centrality using the bilateral trade data set extracted from the BACI-
CEPII database, and to which the Broad Economic Categories classification was applied
to distinguish between intermediate and finished products. We restricted our analysis
to three industries (i.e., Electronics, Motor Vehicles, and Textiles and Apparel), and two
years (i.e., 2007 and 2014). Our findings suggest that countries hold different positions
Cingolani et al. Applied Network Science  (2017) 2:21 Page 18 of 20
at the various stages of the international production process, and these positions change
over time. Moreover, these variations in centrality according to the roles countries occupy
along the GVNs would remain undetected if more traditional measures of market power
based on aggregate trade values were used. In the Electronics industry, for example,
China and Taiwan are highly ranked in terms of aggregate gross imports, and yet they
do not hold an equally highly ranked position at the downstream production stage (see
Additional file 1: Table S1).
More generally, even though rankings of countries based on our centrality measures
are somehow correlated with rankings based on more traditional measures of trade, these
correlations tend to weaken when focus is restricted to the top-ranked countries. Indeed
the top countries according to traditional measures do not necessarily occupy the same
positions when ranked according to any of our centrality measures. Moreover, our anal-
ysis suggests that these differences between rankings are likely to amplify within more
traditional industries in which smaller and less developed countries can secure a relatively
central position, as is the case of Textiles and Apparel.
Our study contributes to recent debates on trade in value added generated in GVCs,
and based on national input–output tables and international trade statistics (Lejour
et al. 2014). Our proposed recursive indicators extend previous studies in that they allow
us to clearly assess a country’s centrality at a distinct stage in the global production net-
works as a function of the centrality of other countries at other stages. Our findings
may assist policy-makers in their efforts to improve countries’ international positions
and competitive advantage. Centrality in an international production system is not only a
function of how upstream or downstream a country is positioned along a linear sequence
of production steps. Indeed, by simply moving along a GVC, a country does not necessar-
ily improve its centrality and market power. By contrast, our analysis shows that choosing
the appropriate suppliers and destination markets can have more important implications
for the centrality of a country than the simple pursuit of large trade volumes at a given
stage of the production process. From this perspective, our results can also inform policy-
makers as they select which countries, given their initial positions in the GVNs, are most
suitable for signing successful trade agreements.
In addition to the GVNs, our centrality measures can also be applied to other empiri-
cal settings in which the data can be represented as input-output K–partite graphs with
K distinct sets of nodes. This is the case, for example, of inter-firm networks in which the
firms are connected along serial supply chains within or across countries (Coe et al. 2008),
or innovation networks in which pools of knowledge can combine and be transformed
along generative processes leading to the production of new knowledge (Ernst and
Kim 2002; Renoust et al. 2017). Similarly, the process of financial intermediation between
savers and borrowers lends itself to the analysis of the centrality of the economic actors
located at the various stages of the financial processes (Battiston et al. 2003). Alterna-
tively, our measures can capture the role that banks play in the interbank lending market
as a function of the position they occupy at the various stages of the lending process
(Bardoscia et al. 2017; Battiston et al. 2012).
Our analysis is not without its limitations, and can be further extended along a number
of avenues. First, the formalisation of centrality was based on the definition of the GVN
as a tripartite graph, thus representing the production process as organised into three
distinct stages. Longer sequences of production stages can be accounted for, and a more
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refined centrality measure can be formalised so as to reflect the positions of countries,
located halfway along the transformation process, that both import and export interme-
diate inputs. Second, while our analysis was restricted to two years, a longer observation
period can certainly provide useful insights into the patterns of evolution of centrality
over time. Finally, future work can be extended beyond the three industries here inves-
tigated, and can thus contribute toward a comparative assessment of GVNs involving
various proportions of low- and high-skilled labour and of capital.
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